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ing to contain the plaintiff's name as producer as required by contracts with the
exhibitors who brought such advertising material from the defendant, an injunction was granted on the theory that the manufacturing and distributing of the
inferior material for the purpose of being used in a manner which violated
exhibitors' contracts was a direct inducement of breach. Paramount Pictures v.
Leader Press, 106 F. (2d) 229 (C.C.A. 1939).
One question raised in the principle case of Wilkinson v. Powe, supra, is not
answered satisfactorily by the court, nor does there seem to be any decision
directly in point. In that case the plaintiff actually breached the contract, yet was
allowed to recover against defendant for inducing the farmers to breach their
contracts with the plaintiff. In all other cases cited, as in Knickerbocker Ice Co.
v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 107 Md. 556, 69 Atl. 405 (1908) cited in the principal
case as having almost analogous facts, the actual breach was not by the party
bringing the action. The language of Aalfo Co., Inc. v. Kinney, supra, might be
extended to fit the situation, where the court says that the act of third persons
in maliciously and without legal justification preventing performance of a contract by a party who was willing to perform would make such third persons
liable in damages to either contracting party that suffers injury as the direct
result of such act. In Wilkinson v. Powe the plaintiff suffered injury as the direct
result of the defendant's act in being forced to breach his contract with the
farmers.
JOAN MOONAN.

Torts-The Theory of "Subsequent Negligence."-Plaintiff, while crossing
a street at an intersection which was regulated by traffic lights, was struck by
the left fender of defendant's auto. The street runs east and west and plaintiff was crossing from north to south on the east side of the intersection.
Plaintiff used the crosswalk and looked at the traffic lights before crossing.
The light was in plaintiff's favor so plaintiff started to cross. Plaintiff proceeded
across the street without any further observation of traffic or traffic lights.
While plaintiff was crossing, the traffic light changed. When in about the center
of the street, defendant's auto, coming from the west, struck plaintiff. The
lower court instructed the jury that if the light changed while plaintiff was
crossing the street, she continued to have right to pass to the other side of
the street before defendant could start his car in such a way and to such an
extent as to collide with her. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and
judgment was rendered accordingly.
On appeal, held, judgment reversed, the trial court's instructions being
erroneous in that they suspended the duty of plaintiff to use reasonable care
after starting across street. Plaintiff, in an attempt to have judgment affirmed,
argued that defendant was guilty of subsequent negligence. In refuting plaintiff's attempt to apply the doctrine of subsequent negligence, the Michign Supreme
Court spoke as follows: "To apply the theory of subsequent negligence, the
plaintiff's negligence must have come to rest and defendant must have discovered
such negligence in time and with the ability to avoid the accident and have
failed to do so." Sloan v. A-mbrose, 1 N.W. (2d) 505 (Mich. 1942).
The theory of subsequent negligence provides for recovery on the part of the
plaintiff, if, after placing himself in a position of peril, the plaintiff's negligence
comes to rest and the defendant discovers such negligence in time and with
ability to avoid injury to plaintiff and fails to do so.
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Subsequent negligence of the defendant obviously becomes pertinent only
when there is causal negligence of the plaintiff involved in the action. Wells v.
Oliver, 283 Mich. 168, 277 N.W. 872 (1938) ; Gallagher v. Walter, 299 Mich. 69,
299 N.W. 811 (1941).
All jurisdictions applying the doctrine agree that the plaintiff's negligence
must come to rest before defendant's negligence operates to cause injury to the
plaintiff. For example, in Butler v. Rockland, T. & C. Ry., 99 Me. 149, 58 Atl.
775 (1904), which is strikingly similar to the principal case, plaintiff was driving
a covered delivery wagon, the cover extending so far forward that plaintiff
couldn't see out at right angles without leaning forward. One of defendant's street
cars was approaching as plaintiff came out of a yard with his wagon. Plaintiff
neither saw nor heard any cars, bell or gong. The street car struck the wagon
and plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff could have seen the car coming if he had
taken the trouble to look. The court held that the negligence of the brakeman
in failing to stop street car was not subsequent but contemporaneous with negligence of plaintiff. To the same effect are Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co.
v. Aetna Accident & Life Ins. Co., 184 Ala. 601, 64 So. 44 (1913); Routt v.
Berridge, 294 Mich. 666, 293 N.W. 900 (1940); Heffelfinger v. Lane, 239 Ala.
659, 196 So. 720 (1940).
The authorities differ on the question whether the defendant must have
actual knowledge of the peril to the plaintiff or whether something less is sufficient to hold the defendant liable. The Michigan rule says that in a case where
defendant, who knows or ought to know by exercise of ordinary care of the
precedent negligence of plaintiff, by his subsequent negligence does plaintiff an
injury, this amounts to "gross" negligence of defendant which will excuse contributory negligence of plaintiff. Gibbard v. Cursan, 196 N.W. 398 (Mich. 1923).
On the other hand, in the case of Srogi v. New York Central R. Co., 286 N.Y.S.
215, 247 App. Div. 95 (1936), the court stated: "It is important to note that,
as applied in this jurisdiction, this doctrine (subsequent negligence) is predicated
upon the knowledge of the peril being brought home as an actual fact to the
person charged with the subsequent negligence. It is not sufficient to prove that
the defendant ought to have discovered the deceased's perilous situation by the
exercise of ordinary care. It is what the defendant did or failed to do after
acquiring knowledge of the peril that constitutes the breach of duty." Young v.
Woodward Iron Co., 216 Ala. 330, 113 So. 223 (1927) is in accord with the
latter view.
There is a distinction made in considering the nature of a defendant's negligence. In Gibbard v. Cursan, supra, plaintiff's intestate walking north on right
side of highway a foot from edge of pavement was struck by a truck going
north; the truck gave no warning till it was almost upon her. Deceased then
became excited and ran in front of truck. The court held that the subsequent
negligence of defendant would be considered gross negligence to enable the
plaintiff to recover. But in the case of Southern Ry. Co. v. Diffley, 228 Ala. 490,
153 So. 746 (1934) where engineer had warning of deceased's perilous position
and could have stopped the train in time, the court distinguished between subsequent negligence which is inadvertent failure to use all means at hand known
to skillful engineers, in their proper order and effectiveness, to avert injury, and
wantonness which is failure to use such means in their proper order and effectiveness accompanied by a conscious knowledge of consequences and reckless
disregard thereof. Whether a real difference exists among different jurisdictions
in this respect cannot be determined, however, until it is determined whether the
jurisdictions involved have the same concept of what constitutes "gross" negli-
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gence. The looseness with which the term is used is illustrated by Gibbard v.
Cursan, supra, where the court said: "Such gross negligence is also sometimes
called discovered negligence, subsequent negligence, wanton or willful or reckless negligence, discovered peril, last clear chance doctrine, and the humanitarian
rule."
Subsequent negligence does not differ fundamentally from the last clear
chance doctrine. For example, in an Alabama case where deceased was induced
by defendant's agents to cross tracks while cars of a freight train were being
coupled, it was held that the negligence in consequence of which deceased was
subsequent to that of deceased, and therefore there was no opportunity to
avoid negligence of defendant while defendant did have opportunity to avoid
injuring deceased after his negligence, which may have been induced by defendant. The court held that this evidence made a clear case for the application
of the doctrine of subsequent negligence or last clear chance. Stanford v. St.
Louis & S. F. R. Co., 163 Ala. 210, 50 So. 110 (1909). In Srogi v. New York
Cent., supra, the court said that last clear chance or the doctrine of subsequent
negligence permits recovery by plaintiff who, by his own lack of care, may have
placed himself or his property in a position of danger, provided there is proof
of knowledge of plaintiff's peril by defendant in time to avoid injury complained
of and a failure by defendant to use reasonable means to avert consequence of
plaintiff's own negligence. There is one point on which subsequent negligence
differs from last clear chance, namely, that the plaintiff's negligence must come
to rest. Last clear chance is not emphatic on this point. In the case of Iverson v.
Knot, 298 N.W. 28 (S.D. 1941) where plaintiff in making a left turn into a
filling station, angled across highway to driveway 100 feet ahead and was struck
by defendant approaching on highway, the court held that the doctrine of last
chance applies where negligence of defendant with actual knowledge of the
situation in circumstances imposing upon him duty to realize the danger in time
to avert the accident stands over against the continuing negligence of injured
person without actual knowledge of the situation; but not where plaintiff's
negligence with knowledge of situation and danger stands over against defendant's negligence also with such knowledge.
Wisconsin does not adhere to the doctrine of last clear chance or subsequent
negligence. The case illustrating this point is Switzer v. Detroit Investment Co.,
188 Wis. 330, 206 N.W. 407 (1925). In this case the plaintiff negligently stepped
into an elevator shaft; the operator in the car heard plaintiff's screams but
descended anyway. The court held that plaintiff was barred from recovering
because of contributory negligence on his part even though defendant was
found negligent. The court specifically stated that for any change in such public
policy resort should be had to legislative action. Today the absence of such
doctrines in Wisconsin is immaterial in view of the comparative negligence
law, sec. 331.045, Wis. Stat. (1941).
To understand the reason for the doctrine of subsequent negligence in Michigan it is necessary to consider the problem that faces the courts of that state.
Michigan has no comparative negligence statute, so under the doctrine of contributory negligence plaintiff is barred from recovering if his negligence contributes to the cause of his injury. The courts realize that this situation often
works injustice, so they seize upon the theory of subsequent negligence to balance the scales. On the other hand, the doctrine does not help a plaintiff where
under accepted standards of justice he should not recover. For example, in
Richter v. Harper,,95 Mich. 221, 54 N.W. 768 (1893) the court held that plaintiff could not recover damages when his museum was destroyed by a fire which

1942]

RECENT DECISIONS

233

defendant negligently had set and which smouldered for two days before
breaking forth, because plaintiff knew of the fire and his negligence in not
doing something about it caused the destruction. It was held that contributory
negligence of plaintiff doesn't prevent recovery in a case where defendant who
knows or ought by exercise of the most ordinary care, to have known of precedent negligence of plaintiff, by his subsequent negligence does plaintiff an injury. The doctrine does not permit recovery notwithstanding plaintiff's contributory negligence, but it recognizes that such discovered negligence of plaintiff,
or his negligence which should have been discovered, is not in a legal sense, a
contributing cause to his injury.
WALLACE C. BArz.

